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March 25, 2004
Thank you for the opportunity to provide a statement on proposed House Resolution 568.
I want to make three points. First, the"law of nations" and the practices of other
constitutional systems have been used since the Founding period to assist the Court in
reaching appropriate interpretations of American law. Second, the Court's use of foreign
law in Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003), was not to bind or control its
judgments of constitutional questions under U.S. law but to assist the Court in making the
best interpretations of our own law. Third, legislative directions to the courts on how to
interpret the Constitution raise serious separation of powers questions and might be
perceived to threaten judicial independence in ways inconsistent with important traditions
of American constitutionalism. For these reasons I would urge the House not to adopt the
proposed resolution.
Far from being hostile to considering foreign countries' views or laws, the Founding
generation of our Nation had what the signers of the Declaration of Independence
described as a"decent Respect.2 to the Opinions of Mankind." Congress was empowered
in our Constitution to regulate foreign commerce and to prescribe"Offenses against the
Law of Nations," the President authorized to receive ambassadors, and the federal courts
given jurisdiction over cases arising under treaties as well as under the Constitution and
laws of the United States, and over suits affecting ambassadors, or involving aliens or
foreign countries as parties in some cases. The Federalist Papers explained that
An attention to the judgment of other nations is important to every government for two
reasons: the one is, that, independently of the merits of any particular plan or measure, it
is desirable ... that it should appear to other nations as the offspring of a wise and
honorable policy; the second is, that in doubtful cases, particularly where the national
councils may be warped by some strong passion or momentary interest, the presumed or
known opinion of the impartial world may be the best guide that can be followed.
The Federalist No. 63 (Hamilton or Madison). Although Federalist No. 63 was not
directed to the courts, Federalist No. 80 (Hamilton) explained the need for a judicial
power broad enough to resolve disputes in which foreign nations had an interest in order
to avoid causes for war. U.S. Supreme Court Justices from the founding period
recognized the relevance of the"law of nations" in interpreting U.S. law and resolving
disputes before the federal courts. As Justice Story said, in writing the foundational
Supreme Court decision in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, the judicial power of the United
States included categories of jurisdiction, such as admiralty,"in the correct adjudication of
which foreign nations are deeply interested ....[and in] which the principles of the law and
comity of nations often form an essential inquiry." Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1
Wheat) 304, 335 (1816).
The Justices have used understandings of the law and practice of other nations on a.2
Although there was no opinion of the divided Court and the writ of error was dismissed
for want of jurisdiction, Justices Story, McLean and Wayne concurred" entirely" with the
Chief Justice's opinion. 39 U.S. at 561. The Reporter's Note at the end of the case
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indicates that after the case was disposed of in the Supreme Court, the Vermont state
court concluded that," by a majority of the Court it was held that the power claimed to
deliver up George Holmes did not exist" and discharged him. 39 U.S. at 598. number of
occasions to assist in reaching correct interpretations of the U.S. Constitution.
Thus, for example, in Worcestor v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 560-61 (1832), the Court, in an
opinion by Chief Justice John Marshall, considered the law of nations as helpful in
defining the status of Indian tribes under the U.S. Constitution, concluding that they
retained rights of self-government with which the states could not interfere. In Holmes v.
Jennison, 39 U.S. 540, 569-73 (1840), Chief Justice Taney's opinion relied on the
practices of other nations to help interpret the Constitution as precluding a state governor
from extraditing a fugitive to Canada.
In other cases, as well, the early Court took cognizance of the" law of nations" or other
countries' practices in resolving particular controversies: In The Schooner Exchange v.
McFaddon, 11 U.S. 116, 137-46 (1812), the Court relied on" the usages and received
obligations of the civilized world" to hold a foreign sovereign's vessel in a U.S. port to be
immune from judicial jurisdiction. In Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64,
118 (1804), Chief Justice Marshall wrote that" an act of Congress ought never to be
construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction" exists. And in
determining what the law of nations was, in 1815 the Court commented that"[t]he
decisions of the Courts of every country, so far as they are founded upon a law common
to every country, will be received, not as authority, but with respect." Thirty Hogsheads
of Sugar v. Boyle, 13 U.S. 191, 198 (1815)..
This brings me to my second point. The Court's recent references to foreign law and legal
practice seems to me entirely consistent with the founding generation's respectful interest
in other countries' opinions and legal rules. Lawrence did not treat foreign court decisions
as binding authority, which is an important distinction. Rather, the foreign decisions were
cited in Lawrence for two purposes: The first was to correct or clarify the historical
record referred to in Chief Justice Burger's opinion in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186
(1986), a decision reversed by Lawrence.
As the Lawrence Court wrote,"The sweeping references by Chief Justice Burger to the
history of Western civilization and to Judeo-Christian moral and ethical standards did not
take account of other authorities pointing in an opposite direction," including the
Dudgeon case decided by the European Court of Human Rights in 1981. Second, the
Lawrence opinion suggested, the European decisions invalidating laws prohibiting adult,
consensual homosexual conduct raised the question whether there were different
governmental interests in the United States that would support such a prohibition on
human freedom, and concluded there were not. See 123 S. Ct. at 2483. This use of
foreign law to interrogate and question our own understandings is something that will
help improve the process of judicial reasoning, but certainly does not necessarily lead to
the conclusion that our law should follow that foreign law.
Indeed, on a number of occasions our Court has referred to foreign practice to distinguish
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our own Constitution from that of other nations. In the great Youngstown Steel Case, the
Court held that President Truman lacked constitutional power to order seizure of the steel
companies. Justices Frankfurter and Jackson alluded to the dangers of dictatorship that
other countries had recently experienced, Justice Jackson explaining in some detail
features of the Weimar Constitution in Germany.3 After describing the protections of,
inter alia, England, Scotland and India, against improper custodial confessions, 384 U.S.
at 486-89, the Court indicated that our own situation was similar enough that their
positive experience gave" assurance that lawlessness will not result from warning an
individual of his rights or allowing him to exercise them." Id. at 489. It went on to say:"
It is consistent with our legal system that we give at least as much protection to these
rights as is given in the jurisdictions described. We deal in our country with rights
grounded in a specific requirement of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution, whereas
other jurisdictions arrived at their conclusions on the basis of principles of justice not so
specifically defined." Id. at 489-90. that allowed Hitler to assume dictatorial powers. See
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 593 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.)
("absurd to see a dictator" in President Truman but"accretion of dangerous power does
not come in a day"); id. at 651-52 (Jackson, J.) (discussing German, French and British
approaches to emergency powers). And in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 489-90
(1966) the Court suggested that our Fifth Amendment should be interpreted to provide at
least as much protection to rights against improper custodial interrogations as did certain
other countries.3
Considering other courts' decisions on shared concepts - of liberty, equality, freedom of
expression, cruel and unusual punishment - can help clarify what the U.S. Constitution
stands for - to what extent its precepts are shared, and to what extent they are distinctive.
The U.S. constitution has, directly or indirectly, inspired many other nations to include
commitments to liberty, freedom and equality in their own constitutions. It is thus
understandable that such nations may look to our courts' decisions and over time expect
our courts to be aware of their courts' interpretations of legal concepts having a common
source of inspiration. For the many nations around the world whose own constitutions
have been inspired in part by that of the United States, and whose judges believe that we
share commitments to ideas of liberty, freedom and equality, the U.S. Court's occasional
consideration of foreign court decisions is, in a sense, a recognition of common judicial
commitments -often inspired by the example of the United States - to the protection of
individual rights. And on the current Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist,4 as well as Justices
Breyer,5 Ginsburg,6 Kennedy,7 Scalia 8 and Stevens,9 have referred to or noted foreign
or international legal sources in their opinions in U.S. constitutional cases.
It is thus not only a traditional legal practice but one that has been used by justices who
otherwise have very different views. Finally, the questions of what sources are to be
considered in giving meaning to the Constitution in adjudication is one that is, in my
view, committed by the Constitution to the judicial department. Marbury v. Madison
famously explained:" It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department
to say what the law is." 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803). A core aspect of determining what the
law of the Constitution is requires consultation of relevant and illuminating materials -
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from the.7 enactment and ratification history, from interpretations by state and federal
courts of the provision or of analogous state constitutional provisions, from the course of
decisions by legislatures and executive officials about what action is required or
permitted, and from the considered judgments of other courts and commentators on the
same or analogous questions. All of these kinds of sources have been and may be
considered when the justices conclude that they shed legal light on the problem before
them. Efforts by the political branches to prescribe what precedents and authorities can
and cannot be considered by the Court in interpreting the Constitution in cases properly
before it would be inconsistent with our separation of powers system. It could be seen
both here and elsewhere as an attack on the independence of the courts in performing
their core adjudicatory activities.
Around the world, the most widely emulated institution established by the U.S.
Constitution has been the provision for independent courts to engage in judicial review of
the constitutionality of the acts of other branches and levels of government. Congress
should be loath even to attempt to intrude on this judicial function, with respect to a
practice that dates back to the founding, and at a time when the United States is deeply
engaged in promoting democratic constitutionalism in countries around the world,
including provision for independent courts to provide enforcement of constitutional
guarantees.
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